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The total size of the world population is likely to increase from its current 7 billion to 8–10 billion
by 2050. This uncertainty is because of unknown future fertility and mortality trends in different
parts of the world. But the young age structure of the population and the fact that in much of
Africa and Western Asia, fertility is still very high makes an increase by at least one more billion
almost certain. Virtually, all the increase will happen in the developing world. For the second
half of the century, population stabilization and the onset of a decline are likely. In addition to
the future size of the population, its distribution by age, sex, level of educational attainment and
place of residence are of speciﬁc importance for studying future food security. The paper provides
a detailed discussion of different relevant dimensions in population projections and an evaluation of
the methods and assumptions used in current global population projections and in particular those
produced by the United Nations and by IIASA.
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1. INTRODUCTION
While future trends in the number and composition of
humans on this planet has been a topic of scientiﬁc
enquiry and discussion for centuries and at least since
Thomas Malthus entered the ﬁeld of structured quanti-
tative analysis, the ﬁrst modern global population
projection, which explicitly considered the age and sex
structure of the population (the so-called cohort-
component method), was carried out by Frank
Notestein of the Princeton Ofﬁce of Population
Research in 1945 (Notestein 1945). At the national
level, several population projections precede this ﬁrst
comprehensive global projection. Hajnal (1955) provides
a good overview of these early population projections.
Frank Notestein subsequently became the ﬁrst
director of the then newly established United Nations
Population Division. This unit began producing regu-
lar global population projections in the early 1950s.
Between 1951 and 2008, the UN published 21 sets
of estimates (past and current conditions) and projec-
tions (future) for all countries and territories of the
world. Before 1978 these projections were revised
approximately every 5 years; since then new revisions
(called assessments and published in their World
population prospects series) have been made every
2 years. The most recent UN assessments have a
time horizon to 2050. Bongaarts (2009) gives a
concise summary of the main results and implications
of the UN projections. At irregular intervals the UN
also publishes long-term population projections with
time horizons from 2150 to 2300.
The World Bank started to produce independent
population projections in 1978. These were always
meant primarily for internal use in the Bank’s develop-
ment planning and were published as part of the
series of World development reports. After 1984, the
World Bank projections were revised approximately
every two years and in most cases only one variant
was published but with a long time horizon to 2150.
Around 1995, the World Bank stopped publishing
separate projections but presumably continued to use
them for internal purposes for a number of years.
The Washington-based Population Reference Bureau
(PRB) publishes independent world population pro-
jections (population size only and a single scenario)
every year as part of its annual World population data
sheet. Since 2000 it has published projected population
sizes for all countries and territories of the world
for 2025 and 2050. In some cases the projections
are identical to those of the UN and the US Census
Bureau (USCB), but in some cases different
country-speciﬁc information is used.
The USCB produces single scenario projections for
all countries in the world as of 1985 with a varying
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the International Institute for Applied Systems Analy-
sis (IIASA) based outside Vienna (Austria) began
producing global population projections at the level
of 13 world regions in 1994. One of the purposes
was to produce population projections as part of
the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES)
(Nakicenovic et al. 2000) that underlie the global emis-
sion scenarios used by the Intergovernmental Panel for
Climate Change (IPCC). This was followed by three
rounds of probabilistic projections at the level of 13
regions (which were all published in the pages of
Nature: Lutz et al. 1997, 2001, 2008b). The IIASA
projections come from a distinctly scientiﬁc back-
ground, which is illustrated by the fact that in its
publication (e.g. Lutz et al. 2004a) much more space
is used for justifying and discussing methods and
assumptions than for presenting results. Recently,
IIASA developed (in collaboration with Eurostat and
the UK Ofﬁce of National Statistics) a new approach
for evaluating substantive arguments about alternative
assumptions on possible future trends based on large
numbers of questionnaires ascertaining the evaluation
of alternative arguments by experts. This is currently
being translated (together with Oxford University)
into a new set of science-based population projections
for all countries in the world by age, sex and level of
education for publication in 2012.
O’Neill et al. (2001) published a comprehensive
85-page review entitled A guide to global population
projections. In this article, they describe in considerable
detail the projections of all ﬁve agencies discussed
above. The paper includes a critical review of the
methods used and of the ways that assumptions are
deﬁned by those ﬁve agencies. In addition, the results
are compared in quite some detail. For this reason, we
do not want to repeat the exercise of systematically
comparing the approaches and results of the different
projections, but rather focus on a few key challenges
that point to the future.
In the next section we will discuss the important
questions of what we call ‘dimensions’ of population
projections. The basic idea is that any population is
an assembly of individuals and each individual is
different from any other individual. But which of the
many relevant properties of individuals should we
explicitly consider in population projections? The
lowest dimensionality is chosen for the case that all
individuals are taken as equal (homogeneous) and
only a total growth rate is assumed for projecting
population size. The cohort-component method
breaks down by age and sex; this is a ﬁrst step in the
direction of increasing dimensionality by explicitly
considering these individual properties. But there are
many further properties that deserve consideration in
population projections and which will be discussed in
the following section.
We will also address the tedious but very important
issue of how to deal with uncertainty in population
projections. While a single best-guess population pro-
jection is likely to satisfy the expectations of a
majority of users, disregarding the issues of uncer-
tainty can be rather dangerous and therefore deserves
serious attention. We will then turn to the one issue
that has recently received the greatest public attention,
namely, the questions if and when we will see an end of
population growth followed by a possible population
decline. In the ﬁnal section of the paper we propose
a speciﬁc existing population projection (the UN
scenario of the IIASA Education Projections) for use
in the Foresight Project. We present the results for
the speciﬁed regions and countries in tabular and
graphical form.
2. DIMENSIONS CONSIDERED IN POPULATION
PROJECTIONS
For many users the most important piece of infor-
mation expected from population projections is the
future total size of the population; for many policy
and research questions other dimensions of the com-
position of the population are also of interest. The
dimensions that will be explicitly discussed here are
age, sex, rural/urban place of residence, educational
attainment, labour force participation, parity status,
household status and health status. All these dimen-
sions have in common that they are properties of
each individual member of the population which are,
at least in theory, observable and measurable. They
can hence be called observable sources of population
heterogeneity. These dimensions are not only interest-
ing in their own right for helping to answer speciﬁc
questions relating to their future distributions in the
population but to the extent that they are associated
with different fertility, mortality and migration intensi-
ties, their changing distributions in the total
population also impact on the projected future popu-
lation size. In the following, we will discuss each of
these dimensions individually, assess to what degree
they are likely to impact on the course of overall popu-
lation, discuss how they may be important in their own
right in the context of studying food security, and
review existing global level projections, which explicitly
address this dimension.
It is important to note that in addition to these
observable sources of population heterogeneity, there
is still unobserved heterogeneity in every population
which is hard to capture empirically. Theoretical con-
siderations suggest that such unobserved heterogeneity
can signiﬁcantly impact future population dynamics
(Vaupel & Yashin 1985), but there is little one can do
about it except to be aware of the problem and be
cautious about the validity of the conclusions drawn.
Given this problem associated with hidden heterogen-
eity, it is even more important to explicitly measure
and incorporate the observable sources of population
heterogeneity wherever feasible and thus try to mini-
mize the possible biases caused by overall heterogeneity.
(a) Population size
Most users of population projections seem to be pri-
marily interested in the total size of the population.
From a substantive point of view, however, it is difﬁ-
cult to think of speciﬁc policy or research questions,
where only changes in absolute size matter and
where it is supposedly irrelevant whether one refers
to newborn babies, young adults or frail elderly
people. Presumably, the great interest in data on the
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total population size can be seen as a ﬁrst-order
approximation of the scale of the population-related
issues in particular, if it is assumed that the age pat-
terns of the two populations to be compared do not
differ greatly. Second, total population size is an
important denominator of many frequently used
indicators ranging from gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita to food consumption per person to
greenhouse gas emissions per person. In all those
cases a separately derived total quantity is divided by
total population size in order to produce an indicator
that can be compared across populations.
Traditionally, population projections have been pro-
duced by simply taking total population size and
making assumptions on the future growth rates of
the population. This has been the standard method
until the age-speciﬁc, so-called cohort-component
method became the widely used standard after World
War II. But for some speciﬁc applications, where the
age structure is difﬁcult to assess or where the popu-
lation is simply too small to have meaningful age
groups (as is sometimes the case with small area
population projections), simple growth rate-based
projections are still being used. But for national
population projections, age-group-wise projections
have clearly become the state-of-the-art because
they allow differentiation between the behavioural
components (fertility, mortality and migration) and
embedded changes that are merely owing to age-
structural effects. This is particularly important for
countries that have gone through signiﬁcant ﬂuctu-
ations in fertility and mortality trends and hence
have irregular age structures, such as most European
countries after the two world wars. But even for high
fertility countries that traditionally had very stable
and regular age pyramids, the assumed future fertility
decline will be partly compensated in terms of popu-
lation growth through the age-structural momentum,
i.e. the fact that in the future larger numbers of poten-
tial mothers will enter the reproductive age and the
number of births will continue to increase even if
period fertility is at replacement level. This is another
good reason for explicitly considering the age structure
wherever possible.
(b) Age and sex
Particularly in the context of population ageing, the
explicit interest in the population’s changing age struc-
ture has recently increased signiﬁcantly. While there
has always been an interest by planners in the likely
future number of school-age children or young
adults trying to enter the labour market, the currently
dominating questions relate to the sustainability of
pension systems under conditions of rapid increase in
the number of elderly. Closely related questions deal
with the likely impact of ageing on healthcare cost or
care for the elderly in general. There is signiﬁcant con-
cern that an increase in the mean age of the labour
force may be associated with decreasing productivity
in the future (Skirbekk 2008). These are all questions
for which a projection of the population by age is
essential. Much of this discussion, however, is based
on ﬁxed age categories and does not consider the
fact that healthy life-expectancy tends to increase in
parallel with total life-expectancy. Hence, a 65-year-
old person today is typically quite different from one
of the same age who lived several decades ago and
who had a much shorter remaining life-expectancy.
This idea has recently been translated into a redeﬁni-
tion of age, where age is not just measured as the
time since birth but can alternatively be viewed as
the expected time to death, in which case the popu-
lation dynamics looks quite different (Lutz et al.
2008b; Sanderson & Scherbov 2008).
The distinction between men and women as a key
dimension of population dynamics has been a feature
of demography almost from the beginning. It has to
do with the fact that fertility rates are almost exclu-
sively measured with women. One of the reasons for
this is that not all fathers are known and that the repro-
ductive age range for women is shorter than for men
and shows a clearer and partly biologically determined
age pattern. Also, mortality rates tend to differ signiﬁ-
cantly between men and women. Except for some
cases of extreme female discrimination, male mortality
rates are typically higher at every single age. In
addition to these demographic reasons there is,
of course, signiﬁcant substantive interest in the age-
speciﬁc proportions of men and women in the
population which matters for issues ranging from the
marriage market to labour market to consumer
preferences.
The formal model for doing population projections
by age and sex was introduced by Cannan (1895)
but it took until after World War II to have this
cohort-component method spread around the world
as the dominant way for doing population projections.
Today, it is used by all national and international
statistical agencies.
(c) Rural–urban place of residence
Place of residence has always been an important
dimension since the very origin of demography when
statistical information on households was collected
for taxation purposes and conscriptions for the army.
Associating people with a speciﬁc locality, however,
requires that people have a more or less permanent
residence and are not permanently on the move.
This is one problem facing statisticians when trying
to distinguish between urban and rural populations
in countries (such as China), where millions of
people (the so-called ﬂoating population) are con-
stantly on the move between their home villages and
the urban centres where they work but have no legal
right of residence. Another problem with comparing
reported proportions urban across countries and over
time is that there is a multitude of changing national
sets of deﬁnitions based partly on the size of the
agglomeration, its statutory status, its population
density or the proportion of the labour force that
is working in agriculture. Since urbanization will be
discussed elsewhere, it will not be covered here.
From a population projections point of view, the
question whether a person lives in a rural or an
urban community is not only seen in its own right
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heterogeneity. Almost universally women in urban
areas have lower fertility than women in rural areas.
Also in terms of international migration, new immi-
grants today generally move to urban areas except for
some special cases where immigrant labour is concen-
trated in agriculture. With respect to mortality, the
pattern is more complex. While the inhabitants of
cities traditionally had higher mortality owing to a
higher risk of infectious disease, this pattern virtually
disappeared over the course of the twentieth century
because healthcare and education were better in
urban areas. But most recently there are indications
of a reversal, with urban slums in some African cities
having worse mortality conditions than even remote
villages in the same country.
From a methodological point of view, the best
model to project a population by age and sex for
urban and rural areas separately is the so-called
multi-state model, which was developed at IIASA in
the 1980s (Rogers & Land 1982; Keyﬁtz 1985). It
has become the state-of-the-art for multi-dimensional
population projections in which separate fertility, mor-
tality and migration rates are assumed for the different
sub-populations as well as age- and sex-speciﬁc tran-
sition rates between sub-populations. Because of data
limitations, such true multi-state projections by
urban–rural place of residence exist only for selected
groups of countries.
The United Nations Population Division publishes
the only urbanization projections on a global level,
with updates every two years. The most recent revision
(United Nations 2008) estimates the population living
in urban areas in 229 countries and territories of
the world for the period 1950–2005 and projects
the same for 2010–2050 in ﬁve year intervals. The
basic method of estimation and projection is still the
same as when it was developed in the 1970s with
only a few minor modiﬁcations. The main source of
information used in the projection is the urban–rural
growth difference at the two latest available time
points (mostly inter-census). The difference is then
assumed to follow a logistic path and is estimated
based on the past experience of many countries and
the expectation that the urbanization process will
slow down as the level of urbanization grows. In
other words, this is not a multi-state model, but only
the application of assumed overall proportions urban
to national level projections. This model by deﬁnition
assumes continuous increases in the proportion urban
and is unable to model possible ups and downs. This
model is isomorphic to the literacy projection model
that has been used by UNESCO for decades, but
which was recently replaced by a cohort-component
model.
(d) Educational attainment
Like the other dimensions discussed above, education
is also an important source of population heterogen-
eity and bears a signiﬁcant weight of its own. Almost
universally more educated people have lower mortality
and there is sufﬁcient evidence that this is a real effect
and not just owing to selectivity. Also for all
populations that are still in the process of demographic
transition, more educated women have lower fertility.
These educational differentials can be very signiﬁcant.
The Demographic and Health Survey for Ethiopia, for
instance, shows that women without any formal edu-
cation have on average six children, whereas those
with secondary education have only two (see http://
www.measuredhs.com). Signiﬁcant differentials can
be found in most populations of all cultural traditions.
Only in a few modern societies does the strongly nega-
tive association give way to a U-shaped pattern in
which the most educated women have a somewhat
higher fertility than those with intermediate education.
But globally, the education differentials are so perva-
sive that education may well be called the single
most important observable source of population het-
erogeneity after age and sex (Lutz et al. 1999). There
are good reasons to assume that during the course of
a demographic transition the fact that higher education
leads to lower fertility is a true causal mechanism,
where education facilitates better access to and infor-
mation about family planning and most importantly
leads to a change in attitude in which ‘quantity’ of chil-
dren is replaced by ‘quality’, i.e. couples want to have
fewer children with better life chances.
In terms of measuring education, it is important to
distinguish between stock and ﬂow variables. Most
education programmes and studies are concerned
with the process of schooling itself, including many
important topics that range from the construction of
schools and the training of teachers to the organization
of schools, the quality of teaching and the content of
curricula. The extent to which these schooling efforts
cover the entire population are usually measured
through enrolment rates as published for most
countries by UNESCO and other agencies. But for
many of the social and economic beneﬁts of education
it does not directly matter how many people are in
school at any given point in time, but rather how
many have completed their education and use their
acquired skills in the labour force. Hence, the main
interest is not on the ﬂow (school enrolment) but
rather on the changing stock (human capital). The
stock can be measured by categories of highest
educational attainment (here the UNESCO-ISCED
categories have become the standard) as well as by
mean years of schooling. Since the original empirical
data mostly come in terms of attainment and the
calculation of mean years of schooling requires
additional country-speciﬁc assumptions, the former
is often preferred. Also, considering the full attainment
distribution provides information about inequalities
that is hidden in the case of only using an average
such as the mean years of schooling.
Because of the strong association between female
education and fertility, future changes in the compo-
sition of the female population by educational
attainment make a big difference. Since many develop-
ing countries have seen major improvements in school
enrolment rates of both girls and boys in those
countries, the future women of reproductive age are
bound to be more educated than today’s. This great
momentum and rather easy predictability of the edu-
cational attainment distribution is a consequence of
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and then remains virtually constant along cohort lines.
If we know how many 10-year-old girls with some pri-
mary education there are today, we know (when
considering differential mortality and migration) how
many 50-year-olds with at least primary education
there will be in 40 years’ time. Given the fact that in
most countries the younger cohorts are better edu-
cated than the older ones, further declines in fertility
as well as mortality are virtually pre-programmed. In
a few African countries where school enrolment rates
have actually declined over the past two decades,
this has led to a stalled fertility decline and partly
worsening mortality conditions.
Aside from its effects on population dynamics, there
is also signiﬁcant interest in knowing the educational
structure of the population for a broad range of
social and economic development concerns. Based
on a newly reconstructed set of educational attainment
distributions by age and sex (Lutz et al. 2007a) for
most countries back to 1970, it has recently been
shown that indeed the improvement of educational
attainment in the working age population has been
the most consistent and signiﬁcant driver of economic
growth around the world (Lutz et al. 2008a). But
improving education by age and sex has also been
shown to matter for countries transitioning to democ-
racy and more liberal rights (Abbasi-Shavazi et al.
2008; Lutz 2009b). It has already been mentioned
that education is perhaps the single most important
health determinant. For the question of food security,
it has long been shown that the basic education
of the agricultural labour force is a key factor in
agricultural production (Hayami & Ruttan 1971).
As the set of population–education–development–
agriculture (PEDA) models commissioned by the
UN Economic Commission for Africa for a number
of African countries shows, when including education
in an agricultural production function, it turns out
to be one of the key determinants in reducing
malnutrition and food insecurity (Lutz et al. 2004b).
IIASA has recently produced population projec-
tions by age, sex and four levels of educational
attainment for 120 countries following different scen-
ario assumptions with respect to alternative future
education trends and different education-speciﬁc ferti-
lity trends (KC et al. 2010). These projections are
based on a true multi-state model, i.e. individuals are
assumed to be subjected to different mortality and
fertility levels depending on their educational attain-
ment level. Hence, even identical trends in
education-speciﬁc fertility can lead to different overall
fertility levels in the case of differing education
trends. We will return to this issue when discussing
the recommended combination of these education
projections with the UN population projections by
age and sex.
(e) Other relevant dimensions
There are several other dimensions of population that
are considered relevant either in their own right or as
further important sources of heterogeneity. The
parity distribution of the female population, i.e. the
distribution of women by the number of children
they have already given birth to, is an important deter-
minant of fertility in the near-term future. Highly
important for economic and labour force consider-
ation is the distribution of the population by age, sex
and labour force participation rates. While there are
several national projections of future labour force par-
ticipation, consistent global projections do not yet
exist. Another very relevant dimension in the context
of global population ageing and the associated needs
for care for the elderly is the projection of the popu-
lation by health status. While signiﬁcant progress has
been made in producing internationally comparable
indicators of disability and its impact on activities of
daily life, up to now this has not yet led to the pro-
duction of global projections which cross-classify
health status with age and sex. Alternatively, one
could try to classify people according to certain disease
risks or infection statuses (such as HIV-positive) if the
data are available, and a certain disease is of speciﬁc
interest. Finally, an important ﬁeld of analysis and pro-
jections deals with the living arrangements/household
composition of people. Here, some progress in the
direction of global projections has recently been
made in the context of trying to project future green-
house gas emissions and the importance of
demographic/household factors in climate change
mitigation (van Imhoff & Keilman 1991; Jennings
et al. 2004; Jiang & O’Neill 2009).
3. TREATMENT OF UNCERTAINTY
In the ﬁeld of social and economic trends—as in all
ﬁelds that deal with human behaviour—the future
can never be projected with certainty. In the context
of the cohort-component model of population projec-
tion that differentiates by age and sex, all three
components of population change (i.e. future fertility,
mortality and migration trends) are uncertain. For
each of these three components of change, the levels
as well as the speciﬁc age patterns (by sex) are uncer-
tain, but the level is considered to be of primary
importance.
How to deal with uncertainty in population forecasting
was the topic of a recent special issue of the Inter-
national statistical review (Lutz & Goldstein 2004). It
summarizes the state-of-the-art in a ﬁeld of research
that has recently gained more interest both among
demographers as well as users. Based on this analysis,
we will distinguish between four different ways that are
commonly used to deal with the difﬁcult issue of
uncertainty: (i) ignore uncertainty and publish only
one projection; (ii) deﬁne alternative probability-free
scenarios; (iii) publish high, medium and low variants
that are supposed to cover a ‘plausible range’; and (iv)
produce fully probabilistic projections that give
quantitative information about the range of uncertainty.
For many users it is sufﬁcient to have only one
‘best-guess’ forecast. This is the projection which is
seen as the most likely population trajectory from
today’s perspective, based on the best knowledge avail-
able today. Such a projection can give some orientation
about the direction into which things are moving. It is
sufﬁcient for many applications with a relatively short
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deviation from the projected mean are negligible. But
for many planning purposes these costs can be rather
signiﬁcant. For example, if there is a plan to build a
new primary school and the projection should tell
the local authorities how many 5–10-year-olds there
are likely to be in the next 10–20 years in a certain
school district, such projections are associated with
signiﬁcant uncertainties and any deviations from the
best-guess projection can turn out to be rather costly.
This is even more so for projections of the number
of people with pension entitlements in a given country.
In terms of global level projections, those presented by
the USCB, the World Bank and the Population Refer-
ence Bureau provide only single projections for all
countries in the world.
The deﬁnition of ‘alternative scenarios’ is a fre-
quently chosen approach that goes beyond a single
projection and presents the user with several possible
future trajectories. The terminology is somewhat
inconsistent and variants (see next paragraph) are
often called scenarios. Generally, scenarios are deﬁned
as consistent sets of assumptions. The notion orig-
inally came from the world of theatre, where scenes
show consistent pictures of our possible setting. In
demography, this is typically done by combining
different assumptions about future trends in fertility,
mortality and migration in a way that should ‘not be
impossible’. Hence, scenarios are generally considered
free of probabilities with the only criterion being
internal consistency. The user is given a broad range
of what could be theoretically possible without being
told what is likely to happen and what probability
range is covered by the interval between the highest
and lowest scenario considered. At the global level,
the most frequently used population scenarios are
those produced in the context of the SRES scenarios
of the IPCC (Nakicenovic et al. 2000), which in
turn are based on combinations of projections pro-
duced by IIASA and the United Nations Population
Division. Eurostat also presents its population
projections in the form of different scenarios and an
increasing number of European national statistical
agencies follow this practice.
The presentation of ‘high, medium and low var-
iants’ goes a step further in providing the user with
some range of uncertainty that can be interpreted
intuitively. For many decades, this approach has
been the common practice of the UN population pro-
jections as well as a large majority of national statistical
ofﬁces. The variants are mostly generated by assuming
three alternative fertility trajectories, which are then
combined with identical mortality and migration tra-
jectories. They are typically presented to the user as
providing a ‘plausible range’ of future population
trends, hence providing a ﬁrst approach to uncertainty
although the user is not speciﬁcally told what is meant
by ‘plausible’. Does it mean 100 per cent of all poss-
ible cases, 80 per cent or only 50 per cent? A further
shortcoming of this approach is that it only covers
the uncertainty associated with future fertility trends
and does not include uncertainties associated with
future mortality or migration. Since fertility is the
most important determinant of long-term population
growth, this can be viewed as an acceptable simpliﬁca-
tion when interested primarily in total population size.
When the interest is in population ageing, however, or
age-speciﬁc indicators such as the future proportion of
the population above age 80, this can result in a major
underestimation of uncertainty. A ﬁnal problem with
this approach arises when aggregating national projec-
tions to regional or global ones. The global high
variant of the UN projections is calculated as the
sum of all national level high variants, hence assuming
that there is a perfect correlation among all national
trends. Each country simultaneously experiences the
highest plausible fertility trajectory. Such perfect cor-
relation is highly unlikely, however, and a higher
than expected trajectory in one part of the world
may be partly offset by diverging trends in other
parts of the world. Hence, what is considered as a
plausible range at the national level is not necessarily
plausible at the global level.
Only ‘fully probabilistic’ projections can avoid such
problems. These are based on pre-deﬁned uncertainty
distributions over time for each of the three com-
ponents which are stochastically combined in large
numbers (typically several thousands) of cohort-com-
ponent projections with the individual random draws
being subject to assumed autocorrelations and, in the
case of multi-regional projections, correlations
among the regions. In most projections, the com-
ponents are assumed to be uncorrelated between
each other. As the ﬁeld of probabilistic population pro-
jections has grown, there have been essentially three
traditions in deﬁning the uncertainty distributions:
one based on time series analysis (which is only appli-
cable to countries that have long empirical series of
data and where no structural discontinuities are
expected); one based on the analysis of the errors of
old projections (ex post error analysis combined with
the assumption that future errors will essentially be
the same as past projection errors); and one based
on the evaluation of expert arguments resulting in
sets of subjective probability distributions. While
more experts as well as national and international
agencies have entered this ﬁeld of probabilistic projec-
tions, some convergence among these different
approaches seems to be ongoing. It is also interesting
that the initiative for doing such projections does not
always come from the producers but rather from the
users. For example, in the case of the UK Ofﬁce of
National Statistics, such projections were recently pro-
duced upon request by the ﬁnancial planning
authorities. At the global level, IIASA (Lutz et al.
1997, 2001, 2008b) has produced the only probabilis-
tic population projections at the level of 13 world
regions.
From a theoretical perspective, fully probabilistic
projections are superior in avoiding the problems of
other approaches as discussed above. They provide
the users with the most comprehensive and detailed
information in terms of the demographic ‘risks’ that
can be combined with a cost function. But this
approach is criticized by some as conveying a false
sense of precision. It is indeed true that this approach
requires more detailed explicit assumptions in terms of
the full distributions and correlations than the other
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istic projections argue that they only try to make
otherwise implicit assumptions explicit and extensive
sensitivity analyses show that the overall results tend
to be very robust to changes in the speciﬁc shapes of
the assumed uncertainty distributions. But at this
stage it is clear that a universally accepted approach
to quantitatively describing the uncertainty of popu-
lation projections has not yet been developed and
more research in this ﬁeld is needed.
A ﬁnal source of uncertainty that often tends to be
disregarded in population projections is the uncer-
tainty about current conditions, i.e. the population
size and structure as well as the levels of fertility and
mortality in a given country in the starting year of
the projections. While this tends to be well documen-
ted in industrialized countries, there are major gaps of
information, in particular, in Africa and parts of Asia.
For many countries the information is only based on
sample surveys and for some countries even such
information is not available. While the UN Population
Division makes heroic efforts to come up with popu-
lation estimates for all countries in the world, the
fact that many numbers referring to the recent past
have to be adjusted in every new assessment round
as new information becomes available shows how dif-
ﬁcult this task is. But demographers have become so
used to having a precise point estimate for any demo-
graphic indicator, even in countries with very
fragmentary empirical information, that they often
forget about the uncertainty of those indicators refer-
ring to the starting conditions when making
projections. A recent study on past projections in ﬁve
southeast Asian countries (Khan & Lutz 2008)
showed that the errors introduced by incorrect infor-
mation about starting conditions was in some cases
even higher than the error owing to incorrect assump-
tions about the future. Lutz et al. (2007b) expanded
the concept of probabilistic population projections
to explicitly include the uncertainty about starting
conditions in addition to the uncertain future paths
for the three components. This is even relevant at
the level of world population projections because of
the great uncertainty of current fertility levels in
the world’s most populous country, China, as will be
discussed in more detail below.
4. THE PROSPECT OF WORLD POPULATION
STABILIZATION OR DECLINE AFTER PEAK
There has been much discussion recently about the
long-term outlook for world population and in par-
ticular whether the global population is likely to
stabilize or even decline in size after a peak during
the second half of the twenty-ﬁrst century. This discus-
sion was, in part, triggered by an article published in
Nature in 2001 entitled The end of world population
growth (Lutz et al. 2001), which indicated that there
was an 80–90% chance that the world population
would reach a peak before 2100 and start to decline
thereafter. Whether or not such a peak will actually
occur and at what level and how steep the following
decline will be is primarily a function of the assump-
tions made about long-term fertility levels in
different parts of the world.
When it comes to global population projections
beyond 2050, there are only the occasionally published
UN long-term projections as well as the IIASA world
population projections for comparison. In 2004, the
UN Population Division published a study entitled
World population to 2300 (United Nations 2004)i n
which different long-term scenarios were presented
for all countries in the world by extending their usual
projections to 2050 by another 250 years. While life-
expectancy was assumed to continue to increase over
the entire period although at a decelerating rate,
the fertility scenarios deﬁned were all very close to
replacement level. Of the three long-term fertility
assumptions, the low one assumed universal conver-
gence to 1.85, the high one to 2.35 and the medium
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Figure 1. Total world population in billions: probabilistic projections until 2100. Yellow, 95% interval; green, 60%; blue, 20%
and extensions to 2200. The scenarios shown combine different levels of total fertility rate as indicated with the assumption
that life-expectancy continues to increase up to a maximum level of 120 years. Source: Lutz & Scherbov (2008).
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what below 2.1 under good mortality conditions). It is
interesting to note that the fertility level of 1.85, which
in the projections to 2050 is assumed to be the conver-
gence level of the medium variant (with the low variant
being 1.35) for the long-range projections, is the
lowest fertility scenario presented. But even these
very small differences in the long-term fertility levels
produce signiﬁcantly different long-term global popu-
lation sizes: by 2100, the resulting populations are 5.5
(low), 9.1 (medium) and 14.0 (high) billion, and by
2200, the differences further increase to 3.2, 8.5 and
21.2 billion, respectively. Hence, the medium scenario
results in some sort of population stabilization in the
very long run, but only because global long-term
fertility is assumed to remain constant exactly at the
replacement level of fertility—a level that is deﬁned
as the one producing long-term stationarity. Minor
deviations to the lower side will produce signiﬁcant
population decline and to the higher side will result
in substantial long-term increases.
Lutz & Scherbov (2008) recently published another
set of long-term global projections, which extends the
IIASA probabilistic population projections—which go
to 2100—further into the future by deﬁning scenarios
covering a wider range of possible future fertility levels.
Selected ﬁndings are shown in ﬁgure 1 and were dis-
cussed in a recently published editorial in the Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society entitled Towards a world
of 2–6 billion well-educated and therefore healthy and
wealthy people (Lutz 2009a). The extension scenarios
start in 2080 (the year until which the assumptions
for the probabilistic projections were deﬁned); some
scenarios continue from the level of the median of
the projected distribution; others from the upper and
lower bounds of the projected 90 per cent uncertainty
range (ﬁgure 1).
The ﬁgure clearly illustrates what has been dis-
cussed above with regard to the UN long-range
projections. In the long run global fertility levels
below 2.0 will result in population decline and above
2.0 in long-term population increase. But the ﬁgure
also illustrates that there is a real chance that global
population could fall below its current size by the
middle of the next century, even if global fertility
levels were somewhat higher than what is being
experienced in Europe today.
5. PROPOSAL FOR USE OF POPULATION
PROJECTIONS IN FOOD SECURITY
ASSESSMENTS
The criteria for recommending a speciﬁc population
projection to be used for the assessment and planning
of global food security include both the widespread
use and acceptance by major international agencies
as well as substantive dimensions, such as the detail
of relevant information, its scientiﬁc basis and the
plausibility of the assumptions made.
In terms of the use of international population
projections, there is no doubt that the UN population
projections dominate the ﬁeld. This is mostly owing to
their long and well-established tradition and the easy
availability of country-speciﬁc data for both estimates
and projections (from 1950 to 2050). Also, for all
international agencies that are part of the UN family
of agencies (including the Food and Agriculture
Organization), there is an institutional agreement to
only and consistently use the UN projections in
order to avoid embarrassment arising from using
different numbers in different parts of the UN.
Hence, despite the above described shortcomings of
the UN projections, particularly in the way they deal
with uncertainty, there is no doubt that virtually all
groups and agencies dealing with food security and
agriculture expect to see the UN medium variant as
their population projection of choice. For this reason
and with the only exception of China—as discussed
below—this driver review also recommends using the
UN medium variant in terms of population size and
the age and sex structures that come with it.
But this review can do better than just considering
the population by age and sex. As discussed above,
education is a key dimension in the study of develop-
ment and food security. IIASA has recently produced
population projections for most countries in the
world by age, sex and four levels of educational attain-
ment up to 2050. While the baseline scenario in these
projections deviates from the UN medium variant in
assuming different future fertility levels throughout
Europe (following the Eurostat projections that
have been worked out in collaboration with national
statistical ofﬁces) as well as in some east Asian
countries, IIASA has also calculated a so-called ‘UN
Scenario’ for comparative purposes. Since in the pro-
jections by level of education assumptions are
deﬁned in terms of future education-speciﬁc fertility
and mortality trends, which then have to be weighted
by the size of the respective education categories if
overall fertility and mortality rates are to be calculated,
the changing educational composition over time
induces differences to the UN projections even if edu-
cation-speciﬁc fertility and mortality assumptions are
deﬁned to be as close as possible to the UN assump-
tions. A full congruence of the two sets of
projections can only be achieved through an iterative
procedure in which for every country and every point
in time, the education-speciﬁc rates are modiﬁed in a
way that their weighted average becomes identical to
the overall rates assumed by the UN (2009). This pro-
cedure has been performed for all countries for the
‘UN-Scenario’ and results in a projected age, sex
and education structure that is identical to the age
and sex structure of the UN medium variant, but
also gives the education distribution as well. The
user can then choose whether to use this scenario,
which is perfectly in line with the widely used UN pro-
jections, or alternatively take the projections that result
from the independently deﬁned education-speciﬁc fer-
tility trends. Since for the coming 40 years (time
horizon 2050), the differences between these two scen-
arios are minimal, in the following we will illustrate
only the ‘UN Scenario’.
Only for China do we recommend a deviation from
the UN medium variant because China has such sig-
niﬁcant weight when studying the world population
and there are convincing arguments that fertility in
China is currently signiﬁcantly lower than given by
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The 2008 UN assessment gives a total fertility of 1.77
for China for the periods 2000–2005 and 2005–2010.
This is subsequently assumed to increase to 1.79 in
2010–2015, 1.84 in 2015–2020 and stay constant at
1.85 thereafter. But the level of fertility in China
around the 2000 census and thereafter has become a
topic of intense scientiﬁc analysis and discussion.
While the National Statistical Agency published the
ﬁgure of 1.22 for the census year, most scholars
agree that this number reﬂects an undercount with
the only question being how much of an undercount.
In an effort to produce probabilistic population projec-
tions for China that also assume uncertain starting
conditions, Lutz et al. (2007b) reviewed more than
20 different estimates based partly on different
methods and different data sources. They concluded
that the best guess for 2000 was a level around 1.5
with signiﬁcant uncertainty bounds. Most recently, a
new study by Morgan et al. (2009) convincingly
demonstrates that total fertility is currently slightly
below 1.5 and is expected to remain there at least for
the coming two decades. Based on this strong scientiﬁc
reasoning, we suggest that the best-guess projections
used for China should be based on a constant total
fertility assumption of 1.5. This has been implemented
in the output tables and graphs given below.
6. DESCRIPTION OF RESULTS
The following section presents and discusses selected
results of the chosen UN Scenario of the IIASA
global projections by level of education by using
the regional deﬁnitions given as a standard for all the
driver reviews. These projections are available at the
level of individual countries on the website of
IIASA’s World Population Programme (www.iiasa.ac.
at/Research/POP). In addition to six continents they
list the data for four key countries and ﬁve regions of
special interest. This scenario was calculated on the
basis of the 2006 UN assessment before the 2008
assessment came out, and the UN made minor adjust-
ments between the 2006 and the 2008 revisions.
Therefore, small discrepancies might appear between
the data listed here and those currently available
from the website of the UN Population Division.
Table 1 gives the results in terms of total population
size. It shows the total world population increasing from
an estimated 6.885 billion in 2010 to 7.6 billion in
2020, 8.2 billion in 2030 and around 9 billion by
2050. These numbers clearly indicate the projected
decelerating speed of world population growth. While
the decadal increase in world population is estimated
by the UN to be 760 million between 2000 and 2010,
it is projected to decline to 616 million for the decade
2020–2030 and 322 million for 2040–2050. The dis-
tribution of this growth over continents shows that the
population of Africa is still expected to roughly
double, whereas that for Europe is already on a declin-
ing trajectory. It is worthwhile noting that the
devastating AIDS pandemic, which lowered life-expect-
ancy in the worst-hit countries and also had a minor
depressing effect on population growth, does not
really inﬂuence this big picture of population growth.
Of the countries that are individually listed, China—
currently the most populous country in the world with
1.3 billion inhabitants—will continue to grow until
around 2030 owing to population momentum (i.e.
more young women entering the reproductive ages)
even though fertility is assumed to be well below the
replacement level. By 2050, China’s population size is
expected to be lower than it is today and 420 million
lower than India’s, which is likely to surpass China as
the most populous country shortly before 2020.
While the picture of future population growth is
quite differentiated, with some countries and regions
expected to grow substantially, whereas others are
expected to shrink in terms of future population
ageing, all countries and regions are moving in the
same direction. Currently about 8 per cent of the
total world population is above the age of 65. This pro-
portion is likely to double over the coming 20 years
and by 2040 reach the level of 16 per cent, which is
the level currently experienced in Europe. Asia is the
most rapidly ageing continent where the current pro-
portion above age 65 is likely to increase by a factor
of three from currently 7 to 21 per cent in 2050.
China will rapidly catch up with Europe and reach
some 27 per cent above the age of 65 by the middle
of the century, although currently its proportion
elderly is only half of the European one. Even in
Africa where the population structures are still very
young (only 3% of the population are above age 65),
the projected increase in life-expectancy together
with declines in fertility will result in signiﬁcant
ageing in the longer run (table 2).
When interpreting these numbers on projected
proportions elderly, we also need to consider that
disability-free life-expectancy so far tends to
increase at roughly the same speed as total life-
expectancy and that the 65-year-olds of the future
can be expected to be in better health conditions
than the 65-year-olds today. It has recently been
Table 1. Projections of total population size for continents
as well as selected countries and regions (UN Scenario of
IIASA education projections).
area 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
world 6124 6885 7617 8233 8699 9021
Africa 821 1032 1271 1518 1765 1998
Asia 3705 4145 4546 4846 5024 5095
Europe 729 730 722 707 687 664
Latin America and
Caribbean
523 594 660 713 750 769
North America 316 349 379 405 427 445
Oceania 31 35 39 43 46 49
Brazil 174 199 220 236 248 254
China 1270 1330 1371 1374 1324 1238
India 1046 1220 1379 1506 1597 1658
UK 59 62 64 66 68 69
European Union 482 495 498 496 489 479
Former Soviet
Union
289 284 279 271 261 249
NW Europe 246 253 258 262 262 261
Nile catchment 225 285 354 424 492 555
sub-Saharan Africa 680 867 1081 1308 1540 1761
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regions (UN Scenario of IIASA education projections).
area 2000 (%) 2010 (%) 2020 (%) 2030 (%) 2040 (%) 2050 (%)
world 7 8 10 13 16 19
Africa 3 3 4 5 5 7
Asia 6 7 9 13 17 21
Europe 15 16 19 23 25 28
Latin America and Caribbean 6 7 9 12 15 19
North America 12 13 16 20 21 21
Oceania 10 11 14 16 18 19
Brazil 5 7 9 13 16 19
China 7 8 12 17 24 27
India 5 5 7 9 11 14
UK 16 17 19 22 24 24
European Union 16 17 20 24 27 29
Former Soviet Union 11 11 13 16 18 21
Nile catchment 3 4 4 5 6 8
NW Europe 16 18 21 24 26 26
sub-Saharan Africa 3 3 3 4 5 6
Table 3. Projections of the proportions of the population (above age 15) that have junior secondary or higher education for
continents as well as selected countries and regions (UN Scenario of IIASA education projections).
proportion with at least secondary education
sex area 2000 (%) 2010 (%) 2020 (%) 2030 (%) 2040 (%) 2050 (%)
female world 53 59 65 71 77 82
Africa 26 35 43 52 60 67
Asia 45 54 62 69 76 82
Europe 85 89 92 94 95 96
Latin America and Caribbean 53 62 70 78 84 89
North America 95 94 94 94 94 95
Oceania 96 99 100 100 100 100
Brazil 52 62 71 80 86 91
China 56 66 75 82 89 93
India 28 38 48 58 67 75
UK 73 81 87 90 92 94
European Union 80 85 90 93 94 95
Former Soviet Union 96 98 99 99 99 99
Nile catchment 25 34 42 52 60 67
NW Europe 83 87 91 93 94 95
sub-Saharan Africa 21 29 38 47 55 63
male world 62 67 72 76 79 83
Africa 38 45 52 58 63 68
Asia 59 66 72 76 81 84
Europe 86 89 92 93 94 96
Latin America and Caribbean 52 60 67 73 79 83
North America 94 94 94 94 95 95
Oceania 96 98 100 100 100 100
Brazil 48 56 64 72 78 83
China 71 78 84 87 91 94
India 47 55 63 70 75 80
UK 73 81 86 89 91 92
European Union 82 86 89 92 93 94
Former Soviet Union 96 98 98 99 99 99
Nile catchment 37 43 50 56 61 66
NW Europe 84 87 90 93 94 95
sub-Saharan Africa 33 39 47 54 59 65
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deﬁned as the time since birth but alternatively as the
expected time to death, then the coming speed of
population ageing (i.e. people moving closer to their
death) will be much more moderate. The future
elderly are also likely to be better educated and more
likely to continue to be gainfully employed depending
on the incentive structures that will be in place. The
greatest challenge associated with population ageing
is probably in the poorest countries where often no
old-age support systems exist aside from one’s own
family. This also needs to be considered in the context
of studying future rural populations and the agricultural
work force.
As discussed above, almost universally more educated
people are in better health and are more productive.
Recent studies have shown that there are some
thresholds both with respect to health and to economic
growth in the sense that universal primary education
(one of the key Millennium Development Goals) is not
sufﬁcient but that it requires high proportions of the
population with at least completed junior secondary
education (to age 15) to help bring countries out of
the vicious circle of poverty, high population growth
a n df o o di n s e c u r i t y( Lutz et al. 2008a). For this reason
table 3 focuses on the proportion of the population
with junior secondary or higher education.
The trends shown in table 3 are based on the Global
Education Trend Scenario (KC et al. 2010), which
assumes that in terms of the proportions of cohorts
ending up in the different educational attainment
categories, the countries later in the process follow
the trend of the more advanced countries. Since the
1970s, this trend has been dominated by the speed
of educational expansion of many Asian countries.
Similar expansions are also assumed for the currently
worse-educated populations in Africa which hence
might be viewed as a rather optimistic scenario.
Table 3 also shows that while today almost universally
adult men are better educated than adult women, this
is likely to change in the future because of the fact that
female school enrolment rates in most countries are
approaching those of men and in many countries
even surpassing them.
Figure 2 shows the projected trends in the absolute
numbers of the population by four educational attain-
ment categories for India and China as well as the
region of sub-Saharan Africa. The population below
the age of 15 is indicated as a separate group at the
bottom of the graph. While for China the picture
shows a peaking in the size of the population followed
by a decline over the coming decades, the number of
people with secondary or tertiary education will con-
tinue to increase. The trend in sub-Saharan Africa
shows a very different picture characterized by contin-
ued rapid population growth. India is in an
intermediate position with decelerating population
growth associated with a rapid expansion of the more
educated segments of population. But even in Africa
this projection of populations by level of education
gives rise to more optimism for the future than the
usual focus on population size alone, because it
shows that the most rapidly growing segment of the
population is that with secondary or tertiary education
under this admittedly rather optimistic scenario.
The comparison between India and China in
ﬁgure 2 is particularly interesting since they are the
two population billionaires frequently mentioned
together as the two great economic powers of the
future. But the ﬁgures illustrate quite clearly that in
terms of the human capital of their populations, the
two countries are very different. Over the past decades,
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Figure 2. (a) China, (b) India and (c) sub-Saharan Africa: projected trends in the total population by level of highest
educational attainment (children below age 15 in grey at the bottom).
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near universal secondary education. Although still
less than half of the total population today has second-
ary or higher education, this is certain to change as the
better educated younger cohorts move up to higher age
groups. In contrast, India suffers from the fact that
currently still about half of all adult women have
never been to school. This is also the main reason
why fertility in India is still rather high and as a conse-
quence the population will experience signiﬁcant
growth over the coming decades. Recently, school
enrolment rates in India have increased at all levels
but it will take many decades until India will be able
to match the level of schooling of the average Chinese.
This will have implications for food security, health,
economic growth and adaptive capacity to climate
change.
In conclusion, this review has attempted to high-
light some recent developments in the methodology
and the content of global population projections and
in particular place emphasis on the different dimen-
sions of population change that should be explicitly
addressed in population projections. The educational
attainment distribution has been singled out as a
key dimension, which perhaps should be routinely
added to age and sex in our studies of the trends
and consequences of human population size and
structures.
This paper was prepared for the Driver Review DR1 of the
Foresight Project on Global Food and Farming Futures,
funded by the UK Government Ofﬁce for Science. It is
also based on research carried out in IIASA’s World
Population Programme, which is partially funded by the
European Research Council (ERC) Advanced Investigator
Grant focusing on ‘Forecasting Societies’ Adaptive
Capacities to Climate Change’ (ERC-2008-AdG 230195-
FutureSoc).
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